Born from the ashes: Ethics and law of posthumous reproduction

 

Dr. R. R. Kishore,   
 

 

Abstract

Posthumous reproduction is a profound scientific achievement bestowing biological continuance on human life after death, fulfilling the wishes which were hitherto unattainable. The process has brought  hope and joy to many but its implementation is marred by ethical ambiguity and legislative inadequacy. Many jurisdiction in the world claiming to be a part of scientific social order display a highly restrictive and debilitating approach by forbidding posthumous reproduction.  In this article I discover the fundamental ethical questions which remain unanswered, analyse the law and the judicial responses across the world and discuss the prevailing conflicts and controversies in the regulation of posthumous reproduction. I conclude that judicial decisions are no substitute for legislative policies which need to be evolved on priority in view of fast advancing biotechnology and growing affirmation of posthumous reproductive rights

Keywords:  Sperms, gametes, insemination, surrogate, consent, property, parentage, identity, legitimacy, inheritance rights

Introduction        

  

“They are never going to let me leave this hospital, Mum; the only way I will get out of here will be in a body bag. I want you to carry my babies. I didn’t go through the IVF to save my eggs for nothing. I want you and Dad to bring them up. They will be safe with you. I couldn’t have wanted for better parents, I couldn’t have done without you.”

                                                                                                    ‘A’ to her mother               

The above statement of a terminally ill daughter,  as quoted in the  30th June 2016 decision of the UK’s Court of Appeal in Mr and Mrs M v.  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority enabling a 72 old woman to give birth to her own grandchild by using her dead daughter’s frozen eggs,  reflects stark realities of life and has inspired me to write this article.  (1) Not long ago, death was the ultimate exit. But, not now.  After departure from this planet the dead may continue to live as gametes to create their offspring. Assisted reproductive technologies have made tremendous progress since 1978 when Louise Brown, the world’s first “test tube baby” was born and 1980 when posthumous sperm retrieval was first reported by Rothman. (2) One report shows  that “human semen stored for approximately 40 years (between 39 years, 10 months and 40 years, 9 month) maintained its ability to result in live birth through ICSI-IVF” (3) Motile  sperms have been successfully obtained as late as 36 hours after death.  (4). The persons in persistent vegetative state (PVS) or the victims of sudden and unexpected death may become parents after they are no more.  Also, those who preserved their gametes  before surgical intervention or chemotherapy because of malignancy may become parents after death. “In the 1960s, freezing, or cryopreservation, of sperm was made available to the Apollo astronauts so that even if space travel were to harm their reproductive systems, they could still father healthy children using the   stored  sperm. During the Vietnam War, soldiers sent frozen sperm back to their wives in the United States so they would be fathers when they returned home” (5)

The process of conceiving children after death, spectacular in its scientific promise,  is equally challenging in terms of morality, ethics and law. The ethico-legal paradigms have failed to keep pace with the scientific development and many fundamental questions remain unanswered. In several jurisdictions there are no legislative enactments in place  and the emerging problems are being handled in an ad-hoc manner. Faced with no other option, people have knocked the doors of Courts but the judicial responses have been heterogeneous.  On one extreme are the judicial decisions like  Parpaliax v. CECOS (1984) of the French Court describing  the sperm as “the seed of life... tied to fundamental liberty of a human being” (6); re the Estate of the Late K (1996) of the Supreme court of Tasmania, Australia holding that frozen embryos are entitled to acquire inheritance rights (7) and  Parrillo v. Italy ( 2015) of the European Court of Human Rights, reaffirming the special status of human embryos, denying their donation even for scientific research (8) on the other extreme are the decisions like Davis v. Davis  (1992) of    the Tennessee Supreme Court (9);  Hecht v. Superior Court (2002) of  the California Supreme Court (10)  and  J.C.M. v. A.N.A. (2012) of the  Supreme Court of British Columbia, Canada, (11) holding that the parties are entitled to exercise ownership rights on the embryos and take decisions with regard to their disposal as their  property. Posthumous reproduction thus suffers from moral ambiguity and legal uncertainty and several vital issues need to be addressed in order to make the process meaningful. In this article I  discover the fundamental ethical questions which remain unanswered, analyse the law and the judicial responses across the world and discuss the prevailing conflicts and controversies in the regulation of posthumous reproduction. I conclude that judicial decisions are no substitute for legislative policies which  need to be evolved on priority in view of fast advancing bioetchnology and growing affirmation of posthumous reproductive rights.

Ethical Challenge

Moral status of the human embryo,  nature of  the deceased’s rights in gamete or embryo, consent of the deceased, respectful treatment of  the dead body,  rights of the widow or widower, offspring’s identity, parentage, consanguinity,  legitimacy, rearing, social security benefits,  inheritance rights, and participant’s religion make the process of posthumous reproduction contentious. The process may include several possibilities such as  (i) sperms of the male partner are preserved during his lifetime and the woman’s ovum is fertilized and implanted after the male partner’s death, (ii) ovum,  preserved during the life time of the woman,  is fertilized after her death by the sperms of her partner and it is implanted in a  surrogate, (iii) embryo is created and preserved during the life time of the partners and is implanted after death of the male partner in the woman whose ovum contributed to the embryo or in the event of her death in a surrogate and (iv) sperms and ova are retrieved from the body of the male and female partners after their death and after fertilization  they are implanted in a surrogate.  In terms of biological outcome these combinations produce the same result i.e. the birth of  a child but each scenario leads to different set of social relationships and legal consequences. The resulting offspring may be confronted with a host of challenges such as multiple parentage,  muddled sibling relationship, consanguineous distortions, family destructuring,  emotional stress,  deficient rearing, social rejection, and  legal disputes including problems of inheritance and social security benefits.  Despite tremendous progress in assisted reproductive technologies parental eligibility and obligations remain inadequately defined.   In the case of posthumous reproduction the child may be more vulnerable because of the absence of one or both biological parents. There are primarily four stakeholders in the process namely the deceased partner, the living partner, the child and the State. In view of their stakes  several fundamental questions need to be answered in the context of ethics and law of posthumous reproduction, including the following, 

1.         Does a person possess a constitutional right to reproduce after death?

2.         Does a person possess property rights in his/her gametes or embryo?

3.         Can the gametes be bequeathed and inherited like other properties?

 

4.       Can the gametes be retrieved from the body of the decedent on the basis of consent given by his/her spouse/partner or other family member, in the absence of will or advance directive from the decedent. 

 

5.        What should be the criteria to determine the intent of the person dying intestate with regard to using his/her gametes for reproduction?

 

6.         Can an embryo be implanted and grown in a surrogate in the event of death of both the partners              on the basis of their will or intent?
 

7.        Who will be parents of the child born out of decedent’s embryo implanted in a surrogate? 

 

8.      Is  the woman entitled to implant the embryo created  by her ovum and the sperm of  the divorced/diseased husband, even after her remarriage? If she is entitled to do so is the consent of the present husband necessary? Who will be the father of the child born in this manner, the deceased /divorced husband or the present husband, or both?

 

9.         Is posthumously conceived child entitled to inherit the property of his/her genetic parents?

 

10.       What is the role played by the religion in posthumous reproduction?

 

11.       What are the effects on the personality of the child born through posthumous reproduction?

 

12.       What is the level of social acceptance of the child born through posthumous reproduction?

The above issues make the process controversial. Consent of the deceased poses a serious challenge. Incapacitation due to PVS, sudden and unexpected death and the urgency involved  in the post mortem  gamete retrieval  may make the elicitation of  consent impracticable. In such cases explicit consent of the deceased may not be available and the implied or presumed consent may be the only option. However, even in jurisdictions where explicit consent is not required , the evidence of implied consent may not be found to be convincing and the fertility clinic may refuse to extract the gametes.  “For it seems that in most of these cases, the deceased will not have contemplated the issue of posthumous reproduction or made their views explicit. Consequently, the presumption against consent effectively prohibits posthumous reproduction in the very situations where it is most likely to be requested.” (12)

Participant’s religion may further complicate the problem.  Major religions including  Catholicism (13) and Judaism  (14) do not approve posthumous retrieval and use of gametes. ‘Islam also rejects this procedure because it takes place after the end of the marital term.” (15)

The only credible way to answer the above questions is through consensus among all actors of civil society and evolution of suitable legislative strategies. This is a difficult task owing to  diverse  perspectives emerging out of religious beliefs, cultural sensitivities, socio-economic imperatives and varied value concepts. Furthermore, the individual and common approaches vary because of the accompanying circumstances. An issueless person, suffering from terminal illness or afflicted with malignancy needing chemotherapy may be genuinely interested in preserving his/her gametes which may not be a relevant factor in case of others. Legislative enactments therefore have to be comprehensive and holistic capable of addressing multiple concerns and priorities. As we will see in the later part of this paper, in view of legislative inadequacy the courts of law have attempted to answer some of the aforesaid question through judicial pronouncements, while several of them remain unanswered. 

The Law              

The laws on posthumous reproduction present heterogeneous picture across the world. “Among developed nations, the U.S. assisted reproduction or fertility industry is one of the least regulated.” (16)  Posthumous reproduction is not prohibited by law in the USA. In the context of posthumous reproduction two uniform laws may come  in to operation: The Uniform Probate Code (UPC), 1969 and  the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA),2002  The UPC  governs  inheritance and the decedents' estates in the United States. It has no specific  provisions with regard to  children born out of posthumous reproduction and as such it is not of much help in addressing their  inheritance rights, except in general terms . The UPA , approved in 1973, last amended or revised in 2002, provides a uniform legal framework for establishing paternity of minor children born to married and unmarried couples.  Section 707 of the UPA  deals with parental status of deceased individual. It lays down,

 “If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the child” The Act leaves several vital dimensions of posthumous reproduction unaddressed.

 Assisted  reproduction seems far better regulated in Canada as compared to the USA and several other countries. The process is regulated by the Assisted Human Reproduction Act which came into force in 2007. The Act was last amended  on September 30, 2012. Section 8 (2) of the Act relates to posthumous use of gametes and lays down, “ No person shall remove human reproductive material from a donor’s body after the donor’s death for the purpose of creating an embryo unless the donor of the material has given written consent, in accordance with the regulations, to its removal for that purpose.” (17) As regards the parentage, “The Uniform Child Status Act (2010)2 provides that a posthumously conceived child, or a person who was "married to or in a common-law partnership with" the person who is alleged to be a parent of that child, may apply to court for an order declaring that a deceased person is the child's parent. However, the court may only grant the order if it is satisfied that the deceased's "human reproductive material" was used, and that the deceased consented in writing (and did not withdraw such consent) to be the parent of a child conceived posthumously. Although not binding on any particular province, this uniform act serves as a suggestion for the harmonization of laws between provinces and can be expected to inform discussion and drafting throughout Canada.” (18)

In the UK, Sections 39-41 of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, 2008 (HFEA) contain provisions with regard to insemination by the sperms or the embryo created by the deceased’s sperms. The law allows postmortem fecundation but, along with other riders and restrictions. It  mandates that  a man whose sperm has been used after his death must be considered the father of the child only if he has given written consent (and did not withdraw the consent) to use his sperm after death and the woman  has elected in writing not later than the end of the period of 42 days from the day on which the child was born for the man to be treated   as the father of the child, subject to the condition  that no-one else is to be treated as the father of the child  by virtue of section 35 or 36 or by virtue of section 38(2) or (3), or (ii) as a parent of the child by virtue of section 42 or 43 or by virtue of adoption.

Post mortem fecundation is forbidden in many states of Europe such as Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,  Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. It is allowed in Belgium, Greece and, Spain . There are varied restrictions on the time after death by which fecundation must be started or completed. In Belgium and Greece it is between 6 months to 2 years after the donor’s death while in Spain it is up to  12 months after the donor’s death. (19) The European Society of Human Reproduction and Endocrinology (ESHRE) provided guidelines in 2006 suggesting that PMSR be offered only if the deceased had provided written consent and that, furthermore, the sperm could only be used after extensive counselling and at least 1year after the death. (20)

Australia

In Australia the legislative scenario is heterogeneous and “..... it is important to refer to the law in each state/territory, and/or National Health and Medical Research Council, Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical and Medical Practice and Research (2017) (The NHMRC Ethical Guidelines), in order to determine whether the removal and or use of gametes after a person dies is permissible, and if so the circumstances in which this may occur. (21) 

Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW) provides that use of gametes or embryos is permitted after death if  the gamete provider has consented to the use of the gamete after his or her death, the woman receiving the ART treatment has been notified of the death or suspected death of the gamete provider and the date of death (if known), and  the woman receiving the ART treatment has given written consent to the provision of the ART treatment using the gamete despite the death or suspected death of the gamete provider. (22)

In Victoria, Section 46 of Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) provides that“A registered ART provider may use a person's gametes, or an embryo created from the person's gametes, in a treatment procedure after the person's death only if-  (a) the treatment procedure is carried out-(i) on the deceased person's partner; or (ii) in the case of a deceased woman, by the woman's male partner commissioning a surrogacy arrangement in accordance with Part 4; and (b) the deceased person provided written consent for the deceased person's gametes or an embryo created from the deceased person's gametes to be used in a treatment procedure of that kind; and (c) the Patient Review Panel has approved the use of the gametes or embryo; and  (d)  the person who is to undergo the treatment procedure has received counselling under section 48”. (23)

In South Australia, Queensland, Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania, Western Australia and Northern Territory, there are  no specific legislation on ART. The use of ART for posthumous reproduction may be subject to the Court orders and may be facilitated by the NHMRC Ethical Guidelines.

Israel

At present there is no comprehensive legislation on posthumous reproduction in Israel. The Bill in this regard isabout to be submitted to the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) for consideration. According to the proposed bill, in the absence of provisions made in writing by the deceased, “his wife or steady partner alone may become impregnated from the sperm of the deceased or inseminate her eggs with his sperm…” As currently drafted, it also provides that “relatives of the deceased, except his wife or steady spouse, will not have any standing regarding extraction or use of his sperm, except if the deceased was not married or did not have a steady partner at the time of his death, and only if he instructed so in writing…” As of July 2017, it has yet to be submitted to the Knesset for consideration. (24)

Judicial Decisions

 In 1984, prior  to the enactment of legislations forbidding posthumous reproduction, the French Court, in Parpaliax v. CECOS, while determining the fate of deceased’s sperms, refused to treat them as an ordinary moveable property.  Instead, the Court described the sperm as “the seed of life... tied to fundamental liberty of a human being to conceive or not to conceive.” (25) 

In the USA, in Hecht v. Superior Court, the California Superior Court allowed a probate court to assume jurisdiction over the sperm as property of the decedent. The Court observed , “Given the procedural posture of this case, and the fact that, for purposes of addressing real parties arguments, we are assuming that decedent intended to allow Hecht to use his sperm for posthumous artificial insemination, it is premature for us to apply the Davis test. At this point, the only issue which we address is whether artificial insemination with the sperm of a decedent violates public policy. There is nothing in Davis which indicates that such artificial insemination violates public policy.” and held, “For the foregoing reasons we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering decedent's sperm destroyed.” (26) As regard the  inheritance and social security benefits to posthumously conceived children the  judicial decisions in the United States  have been conflicting.  In re estate of Kolacy the Court decided the twins were the deceased husband’s heirs and once paternity is established, a posthumously conceived child should receive the legal status of heir so that they are able to take property from their parents. (27) In Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a posthumously conceived child must prove a “genetic relationship between the child and the decedent” and the decedent must have affirmatively consented  to posthumous reproduction and support of any  resulting child. In this case, the court compared the succession rights of the children conceived before and  after the death of the husband.  In this context, the Court  identified three “:powerful” state interest :  “The best interest of children, the . . . orderly administration of estates, and the reproductive rights of the genetic parent.” The Court directed the state legislature to address this subject through statute. (28), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit awarded Benefits to the Twins of Rhonda Gillett and  Robert Netting, holding that they were Netting’s children and met the Act’s dependency requirements. (29)

The United States Supreme Court case, Astrue v. Capatoc, aptly reflects the  negative legal implications arising out of posthumous reproduction with regard to social security benefits and inheritance rights. Shortly after marriage with Karen Capato,  in May 1999, Robert Capato was diagnosed  with oesophageal cancer for which he was administered chemotherapy. Robert deposited his sperms in a sperm bank  to be preserved and used for IVF . In march 2002 Robert died of cancer. Using Robert’s preserved sperms Karen became pregnant and delivered a pair of twins. Shortly afterwards, Karen claimed survivorship benefits  on behalf of the twins under the Social Security Act. Karen’s claim was rejected by the Social Security Administration. Karen filed an appeal in the US District Court of the District of New Jersey which affirmed the Administration’s denial of benefits to twins on the  ground that Robert  has not mentioned  any biological children born after his death as inheritors of his property in his will and as such the twins cannot be treated as his “child” in terms of Section 416(h) of the Social Security Act.  Karen appealed to the  Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which reversed the District Court’ decision  in her favour holding that “the undisputed, biological child of a deceased wage earner and his widow” qualify for survivorship benefits and thus the biological child is considered a child under the Act; therefore, there is no need to apply Section  416(h) to determine whether the twins were eligible under Florida’s intestacy statute (30)  The matter finally reached the US Supreme Court which reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals holding that the District Court’s decision was correct because  for a biological posthumously born child to receive Social Security benefits under the Act, the state’s intestacy statute where the wage earner was domiciled must provide that the applicant meet the definition of “child.”, as defined in 416(h) of the Social Security Act. (31)

It may be interesting to see how the  legal status of the offspring likely to be conceived after  the death of biological father has been perceived in other jurisdictions. In Australia, the Supreme Court Tasmania, In re Estate of the Late K,  held that frozen embryo is entitled to acquire inheritance rights. Justice Slicer held that under the civil law the fetus has contingent legal interests which vest and become enforceable upon its live birth. (32) 

In Australia, in 2011, the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Re the estate of the late Mark Edwards, on application by wife for possession of sperm extracted from body of late husband,   held that “Ms Jocelyn Edwards is entitled to possession of the sperm recovered from the body of her late husband, Mr Mark Edwards” for intended use in assisted reproductive treatment to conceive a child although there was  no written consent by late husband to such use. (33)

In the U.K. , Mrs. Diane Blood wanted to use her husband’s sperms which were collected ‘shortly before her husband was certified clinically dead’,  in March 1995,  so that  she could have her husband’s child. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority did not allow Mrs. Blood to use the sperms on the plea that such use was in contravention of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990  because the sperms were extracted and stored  without the written consent of Mr. Blood.  Mrs. Blood’s request for going abroad for using the sperms  was also turned down. Mrs. Blood sought judicial intervention wherein the Court of Appeal ruled that extraction and storage  of her husband’s sperms  was illegal because it was done without  written consent  of Mr. Blood. The Court,  however,  concluded that “Mrs Blood has the right to receive treatment in Belgium with her husband’s sperm unless there are good public policy reasons for not allowing this to happen.”  (34) Mrs. Blood was, ultimately, inseminated with her husband’s sperms in Belgium and gave birth to a healthy child   (35)

However, the 30th June 2016 decision of the Court of Appeal in Mr and Mrs M v.  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority enabling a 72 old woman to give birth to her own grandchild by using her dead daughter’s frozen eggs is a momentous pronouncement, reflecting a divergent approach.  In this case  the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) refused permission for posthumous fertilization and  implantation of the frozen eggs of a 21 year old girl dying of cancer in 2011  in her 60 year old mother on the ground of absence of valid consent of the deceased, as contemplated under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act.  The High Court of Justice , Queens Bench Division, endorsed the HFEA decision.  But, the Court of Appeal, London, relying on the  circumstantial evidence in the nature of conversation of the deceased with her mother  and the fact that  “she asked for her ovaries to be transplanted in her mother” clearly showing  her intent and desire to have the baby created out of her eggs by using her mother as the surrogate,  allowed  the mother’s  appeal  setting aside the High Court’s decision and directed the HFEA to reconsider their decision in accordance with the  wishes if the dead girl.. The decision reflects the need to read the deceased’s intentions and desires in an objective and humane  manner,  keeping in view the real life situations,   rather than  insisting on the literal interpretation of the law. (36)

The Israeli judicial system has moved towards liberalization from their earlier position confining the right of in vitro fertilization solely to the female partner of the deceased . In several cases, on the basis of presumed consent,  the family court has granted permission to the parents to use their deceased son’s sperms to impregnate the  woman who would be the legal and biological mother of the expected child. In 2007, a court allowed the parents of 19-year-old Staff Sergeant Keivan Cohen who was mortally wounded in the Gaza Strip on August 20, 2002 to produce a grandchild using their dead son’s sperm as a “sperm donation” to a single woman who wanted a baby with a known father’s identity (note that otherwise, in Israel there is no option for a known sperm donation). The child who was eventually born from this joint process is now four years old, and lives with his biological mother. The  parents of the deceased enjoy limited status of  the child’s grandparents, having  visitation rights and also the right to provide financial support. (37)

In 2009, a soldier suffering from cancer, donated his sperm while still alive.  A woman was impregnated with his sperm and a child was born. (38) In an another case the wife of a young man who  died in an accident in 2004 got his sperms extracted and stored. Subsequently, the wife adopted a new partner and gave birth to two children with him, and was not inclined to use the stored sperms. The parents of the deceased son wanted to inseminate another woman with his sperms. The widow objected to their request. The District Court ruled that half of the 19 tubes of frozen sperm belonged to the parents of the deceased. The widow appealed against the decision to the Israeli Supreme Court. The matter was hotly contested by the parents but the Supreme Court rejected their claim holding that Grandparents’ rights do not extend to the right to demand the birth of grandchildren. (39)

Discussion                      

1.         Right to posthumous Reproduction

It is only the person who dies, not the personhood. The “deceased does not forfeit all of his or her human status upon death.”   (40) The dead may continue to live through his/her reproductive material. Article 16 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948 states “Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family”.  Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),  entered into force on 3 September 1953, asserts “Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right” The similar right has been recognized under   Article 12 of the Human Rights Act, 1998, of the United Kingdom.  Furthermore, Article 8 (1) of the European Convention affirms “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” Article 23 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) proclaims “ The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized.” As such, right to beget and bear children is an internationally recognized human entitlement. The U.S. constitution does not explicitly recognize a right to reproduce. However, the US Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged a person’s fundamental right to procreate, child rearing, contraception and family relationship. (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) “The philosophical justification for posthumous reproduction stems from a belief that having biological children is a human right. The right to reproductive choice derives from individual free will and consciousness that transcends religious and government authority. Denying the right to procreation is a sentence, perhaps closest in nature, to involuntary sterilization or the death penalty.” (46) 

Any opposition to one’s right to posthumous reproduction appears paradoxical per se. In a world where right to receive organs and tissues from the deceased by others  has been recognized as a normative practice how can one argue that a person cannot use his/her own gametes for fulfilling his /her desire. Resistance against posthumous reproduction, it seems,  is rooted in archaic mindset reflecting taboo and unwarranted moral paternalism. It is the inherent right of every individual to exploit scientific promise to address his/her problems and to pursue happiness as long as it does not affect the rights of others.  Posthumous reproduction in that context is a blissful scientific advancement. As such, prohibition on post mortem fecundation in most of the States of Europe is not intelligible.

2.         Property rights in gametes and embryo

Property rights in human body and its materials has been a debatable issue since long. “No other rule of law can claim as macabre a passage through history as the common law rule that there is 'no property in the human body'. Slavers, grave robbers, grieving widows, freak show exhibitors and harvesters of body parts have featured prominently. The rule is only now coming in from obscurity and assuming growing importance. New uses for the human body, driven by medical advances in IVF, stem cell research, cloning, gene therapy and other like areas, require that we re-examine the efficacy of this rule in its application to modern circumstances.” (47) Although there are heterogeneous judicial approaches with regard to  moral status of the human gametes and embryo ranging from “property” to “seed of life” the Courts in several  jurisdictions have held  that the parties are entitled to exercise ownership rights on the gametes and embryos and take decisions with regard to their disposal as their  property. In the U.S.A., in Davis v. Davis,  the Tennessee Supreme Court,  the first state supreme court to deliberate on the  issue of embryo disposition, held, “[embryos] are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life.”  But, the Court held that the parties were entitled to exercise ownership rights on the embryos and take decisions with regard to their disposal. (48)  In Hecht v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court ruled that a decedent’s frozen sperm were a distinct category of property in which “decedent had an interest, in the nature of ownership, to the extent that he had decision making authority as to the sperm within the scope of policy set by law.” The Court allowed  a probate court to assume jurisdiction over the sperm as property of the decedent at the time of his death. (49)  Supreme Court of British Columbia, Canada, in J.C.M. v. A.N.A. , in 2012, held that the sperm “should be treated as property and divided between the claimant and respondent as such.” (50) In C.C. v. A.W., in a dispute involving four residual embryos after in vitro fertilization,  the Canadian Court, in 2005, decided in favour of A.W. holding that the “remaining fertilized embryos remain her property. They are chattels that can be used as she sees fit.”  (51)  In Parpaliax v. CECOS, the French Court while determining the fate of deceased’s sperms refused to treat them  as an ordinary moveable property  describing them as “the seed of life” but  impliedly recognized the property rights in the gametes by granting  their custody to the deceased husband’s wife. (52) 

The Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Yearworth and others v North Bristol NHS Trust while dealing with the loss of preserved and stored sperms due to fall of liquid Nitrogen below the required level unanimously held that the sperms are property for the purposes of the law of negligence. (53)

The Supreme Court of Queensland, Australia, in 2000, In the matter of Gray refused to recognize property rights in human gametes. While rejecting  the application of the wife for post mortem extraction of sperms of her husband who suddenly died in his sleep the Court observed, “It appears that the underlying principles of law are that those entitled to possession of a body have no right other than the mere right of possession for the purpose of ensuring prompt and decent disposal. The prohibition on interfering with a body sanctioned by the possibility of criminal prosecution indicates that to remove part of the body for whatever reason or motive is unlawful.” (54). In a diverse opinion, in 2011, while examining the  property rights in human gametes, the Supreme Court of  New South Wales, in Re the estate of the late Mark Edwards, after a thorough  analysis of various judicial decisions across the world, observed, “Subject to a consideration of various discretionary aspects to which I am next to turn, in my view Ms. Edwards is the only person in whom an entitlement to property in the deceased's sperm would lie. The deceased was her husband. The sperm was removed on her behalf and for her purposes. No-one else in the world has any interest in them. My conclusion is that, subject to what follows, it would be open to the Court to conclude that Ms Edwards is entitled to possession of the sperm.” (55) 

Perhaps the A’s mother provides the most candid description of their status: “I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that, as far as A was concerned, her eggs held a life force and were living entities in limbo waiting to be born. (56)

3.         Consent

The European Society of Human Reproduction and Endocrinology (ESHRE) 2006   guidelines suggest that PMSR should be offered only if  written consent has been given by the deceased person, thorough counselling has been received by  the surviving partner before taking the decision and a minimum waiting period of 1 year has been  imposed before a treatment can be started.  (57) These recommendations, at times, may not be consistent with the real life situations and larger human interest.  The purpose of consent is to promote autonomy of the individual, not to obliterate  his/her biological expressions and desires. The validity of consent needs to be determined in a candid and realistic manner, under the prevailing circumstances.  Consensual paradigms in case of sudden and unexpected death and the urgency involved  in the post mortem  gamete retrieval have to be pragmatic. For insemination of a remarried woman by the sperms of her deceased husband or implantation of the embryo created by her ova and sperms of her deceased  husband the consent of her deceased as well as the present husband seems necessary. In the event of absence of the deceased  husband’s consent his intent must  be determined by the relevant circumstances before insemination/implantation . The Courts across the world in this regard have adopted a pragmatic and realistic approach  by relying on the intent of the deceased as reflected through accompanying circumstances.  

In this context, the French court’s verdict in Parpaliax v. CECOS  provides a positive and enlightening analysis.

Alain Parpalaix who was diagnosed with testicular cancer , deposited his sperms in a fertility centre in France without specific instructions regarding their use, before being subjected to chemotherapy. Alain could not survive but he married Corrine just two days before his death.  Corrine claimed access to Alain’s sperms in order to conceive his child but the fertility centre denied their access to her. Corrine sought judicial intervention. The French court, in the absence of a written contact, examined the associated circumstances. The fact that Alain deposited his sperms and chose to marry Corrine just two days before his death  demonstrated  his intention that Corrine should carry his child. This was further supported by Alain’s parents who testified that he wanted  Corrine to be the mother of his child. (58) 

In Australia, in 2011, the Supreme Court of New South Wales in  Re the estate of the late Mark Edwards on an application by his wife Ms Jocelyn Edwards for possession of sperm extracted from the body of her late husband, despite the absence of  written consent by her late husband for such use,  issued a declaration that she was entitled to possession of the sperm recovered from the body of her late husband for intended use outside New South Wales to conceive a child.  In the absence of written consent, the Court  relied on the wishes of Mr. Edwards conveyed to his wife in a conversation on the Valentine's Day in which he said, “If something happens to me I would want a part of me to be here with you. Our baby will be a part of us - our legacy even after we are both gone. She will be the bond that unites our families. The bond between [their two children]. If we find out I have cancer I want to make sure we have our baby before I am unable to have one, before I do any chemo. Please promise me you will still have our baby".  (59)

Based on the parental wishes of becoming grand parents, in the absence of written consent, the physicians in Israel have retrieved  sperms from the body of the deceased and the Courts have allowed impregnation of  the unrelated woman to produce child although such a course is not supported by any legislative enactment.  This reflects Israel’s general pro-natalist sentiment founded in the Jewish belief that procreation is a fundamental commandment  within the Jewish tradition, “be fruitful and multiply.”

The 30th June 2016 decision of the UK’s Court of Appeal in Mr and Mrs M v.  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority enabling a 72 old woman to give birth to her own grandchild by using her dead daughter’s frozen eggs also  reflects the need to read the deceased’s intentions and desires in an objective and humane  manner keeping in view the real life situations  rather than  insisting on the literal interpretation of the law. (60)  I agree with the author when she says: “I believe that conditioning the posthumous use of gametes or embryos on the ability to prove that the deceased wanted posthumous children gives the legal system undue authority to determine a person’s genetic legacy. I argue that biological continuity is a human right that neither society nor government has the right to negate. A more logical assumption is that an individual seeks genetic continuity unless s/he says or acts to the contrary.  I see carrying on a person’s posthumous genetic legacy as the essence of the sanctity of life and an act of dignity.”  (61) 

4.         Parentage and rights of the child

The question of parentage of the child borne out of posthumous reproduction is a complex issue.  Two men, the genetic and the  nurturing  may be treated as fathers and three women, genetic, gestational and nurturing may be assigned the motherhood. The time of harvesting the sperm or ovum i.e., before or after the death, is not as vital a consideration as the genetic origin of the offspring. Genetic linkage provides the surest way of establishing parentage and the person’s biological identity. In the UK, the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, 2008 (HFEA) mandates that  a man whose sperm has been used after his death must be considered the father of the child only if he has given written consent (and did not withdraw the consent) to use his sperm after death and the woman  “has elected in writing not later than the end of the period of 42 days from the day on which the child was born for the man to be treated  ...... as the father of the child”. However, the laws in other countries are not so explicit and declaration of paternity solely on the basis of sperms, in the absence of such  legislative provisions, may create conflict of interest and disputes among various stakeholders in the matter of inheritance and social security benefits. In the event of successful implantation and birth, the legal rights of the child and his/her mother, including the paternity of the child and his/her right of inheritance and the right to marry due to possibility of consanguinity may lead to dispute. In the USA, Section 707 of the  Uniform Parentage Act deals with parental status of deceased individual but the Act leaves several vital dimensions of posthumous reproduction unaddressed. In Canada, the Uniform Child Status Act (2010)2 contains provisions regarding the parentage of  posthumously conceived child and serves as a suggestion for the harmonization of laws between provinces but the declaration of parentage is subject to the orders of the Court which may only be granted if the Court is satisfied that the deceased's "human reproductive material" was used and that the deceased consented in writing (and did not withdraw such consent) to be the parent of a child conceived posthumously.  “Although the proposition that after-born children should be legally recognized as the children of their deceased parents is broadly supported, no consensus has emerged concerning the rights of such children to inherit or to claim support from their deceased parents.” and “ considerable disparities remain in the approaches taken by different jurisdictions to the rights of after-born children.  (62)

The Supreme Court of Queensland, Australia, in 2000, In the matter of Gray while rejecting  the application of the wife for post mortem extraction of sperms of her husband declined to exercise the Court’s discretionary powers in favour of the applicant, inter-alia on the ground that the “interests of any child born as a result of the procedure must be of particular importance in the exercise of the discretion. I cannot see how it can be said that the interests of such a child will be advanced by inevitable fatherlessness. The very nature of the conception may cause the child embarrassment or more serious emotional problems as it grows up. More significant, because the court can never know in what circumstances the child may be born and brought up, it is impossible to know what is in its best interests.” (63)

Paternity “ plays an important role in shaping the child’s identity and in fashioning the familial relationship between the child and her relatives, including the husband’s parents, his siblings or his other children.” (64) Fairness and equity mandates that the rights of the child borne out of  husband’s posthumous retrieval of sperms  should not be affected due to presence of the subsequent husband as long as the child’s claim is confined to the assets of his/her genetic father. “The interests of all these parties — the deceased, the widow, the child — as well as the broader social interest, must be weighed if we are to decide on the ethics of posthumous reproduction.”  (65) Scholars believe that “....lack of legislative activity is unfair to the innocent children born into this circumstance. It is time for politicians to step forward into this political hotbed and make conscious, thoughtful decisions regarding the status of these children.”  (66) and  that “.... the posthumous child and the rights and responsibilities relating to such a child, are directly related to the fundamental right to procreate, thus statutes must support rather than prohibit posthumous conception.”  (67)  As such, the law needs to be evolved to equitably define the legal entitlements of the posthumously conceived children and the children conceived during the life time of the parents.

5.       Way Forward

Contemporary world order is founded on human dignity, scientific promise and the rule of law. Human dignity contemplates compassion and beneficence; scientific promise  envisages evolved and awakened minds, free from bias and taboo;  rule of law mandates supremacy and sprit of law based on reason,  logic and equity. All human endeavours need to be tested on the touchstone of these core values. Posthumous reproduction has been available for almost thirty years but it continues to be utterly unlegislated. Owing to legislative inadequacy the aggrieved parties are constrained to seek judicial intervention. But, the Courts are no substitute for legislature. “The possibilities of posthumous reproduction pose fundamental questions about the significance of reproductive material, the meaning(s) of autonomy in the context of reproductive decision-making, and the balancing of interests between the living and the dead.” (68)  “Practical, comprehensive, flexible, and standard laws will need to be developed to provide the necessary guidelines to give parents, doctors, and fertility clinics/sperm banks a reasonable opportunity to provide for posthumously conceived children.” (69)  In the event of dispute between the partners with regards to use of gametes or embryos a balance-of-interests approach may, at times, be valid a option. 

Ability to conceive children by those who are dead  is a profound scientific achievement. Although not explicitly recognized in law, and forbidden in most of the European countries, the judicial decisions reflect a positive attitude towards continuance of the dead in the form of his/her offspring.  With advancing biotechnology rights of the dead have come to the fore and the law has to keep pace with the emerging scientific promise.  Cultivators of law ought to appreciate that posthumous reproduction is a highly personalized expression of the emerging scientific promise  and specific provisions need to be made in the law to ensure timely retrieval of gametes from the dead, without undue legal hurdle. “There is perhaps  no greater way that the living can honor the dead than by safeguarding the pre-death intentions of those who are now deceased, in a matter as fundamental as procreation”  (70 ). “In a society that values the individual's rights of privacy and procreation so highly, where questions on abortion have caused severe internal strife, where single-parents abound, and where so many millions of Americans face trouble conceiving a child, it seems unthinkable that we would unilaterally restrict the rights a person has in his or her own reproductive material and in the freedom to decide when and how to have children. Instead of being scarred for life, these children could certainly grow-up better adjusted than "the kid next door," embraced by the love of a parent who went to great lengths to have them and the knowledge that they were unquestionably wanted.”  (71)

                                                

Conclusion           

Posthumous reproduction is a spectacular expression of advancing biotechnology bringing hope and joy to many  but its concretization is marred by ethical ambiguity and legislative inadequacy. Several issues such as right to posthumous reproduction, moral status of the human embryo; nature of  the deceased’s rights in gamete or embryo; consent of the deceased; respectful treatment of  the dead body; rights of the widow or widower; offspring’s identity, parentage consanguinity, legitimacy, rearing, social security benefits,  inheritance rights and a host of others continue to be controversial. Many jurisdiction in the world, claiming to be a part of scientific social order, display a highly restrictive and anti-futuristic approach as nearly half of the Europe forbids posthumous reproduction.   Incapacitation due to PVS, sudden and unexpected death and the urgency involved  in the post mortem  gamete retrieval call for due consideration while dealing with the issue of consent of the  deceased.  Consensual paradigms in such situation have to be pragmatic. Courts across the world have ruled that a person continues to have rights in his/her gametes and embryo after death and these rights can be exercised either through the deceased’s will or intention. The earlier laws of inheritance  based on the notion that  a person  must be alive at the death of his or her benefactor, or in the womb and later born alive, are not consistent with the emerging scientific promise and human aspirations. Specific laws based on equity and biological proximity need to be evolved with regard to  legal entitlements of the posthumously conceived children vis a vis the children conceived during the life time of the parents. Undoubtedly , the  30th June 2016 decision of the UK’s Court of Appeal enabling a 72 old woman to use her dead daughter’s frozen eggs is an oasis in the desert of ethical and  legal ambiguity. However, the courts of law are no substitute for legislative wisdom. The issue of posthumous reproduction needs to be adequately legislated by evolving comprehensive, pragmatic and humane legislative policies in order to ensure spontaneous and meaningful application of this rewarding reproductive technology.

References

(1) [2016] EWCA Civ 611 

(2) Rothman, CM (1980) "A method for obtaining viable sperm in the postmortem state." Fertil. Steril. 1980; 34(5):512

(3) Andras Z. Szell, Russell C. Bierbaum, W. Brent Hazelrigg, and  Ryszard J. Chetkowski Live births from frozen human semen stored for 40 years  J Assist Reprod Genet. 2013 Jun; 30(6): 743–744.

(4) Shefi S et al. (2006) "Posthumous sperm retrieval: Analysis of time interval to harvest sperm", Human Reproduction 2006;21(11):2890–2893

(5) Lori B. Andrews, New Conceptions 176 (1984).   Also, E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow And The Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, I J.L. & HEAI.TH 229 (1986-87)

(6) Parpaliax v. CECOS, Trib. Gr. Inst. Creteil, Gazette du Palais (G.P.), Sep. 15, 1984

(7) In re the Estate of the Late K (1996) 5 Tas. R. 365 

(8) European Court of Human Rights, Parrillo v. Italy, Application No. 46470/11 , Judgment dated 27-08-15

(9) In Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)

(10) Hecht v. Superior Court (Kane), 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Cal. 1993)

(11) J.C.M. v. A.N.A., 2012 BCSC 584 (CanLII) 

(12) Rebecca Collins,. Posthumous Reproduction and the Presumption Against Consent in Cases of Death Caused by Sudden Trauma Journal of Medicine and Philosophy A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine Volume 30, 2005 - Issue 4,  pages 431-442

(13) Instruction on respect for  human life in its origin and on the dignity of procreation, Congregation for teh Doctrine of Faith, February 22, 1987

(14) Grazi, R V; Wolowelsky J B. (1995) "The Use of Cryopreserved Sperm and Pre-embryos In Contemporary Jewish Law and Ethics", Assisted Reproductive Technology-Andrology, 8:53–61

(15) G.Pennings, G.de Wert, F.Shenfield, J.Cohen, P.Devroey and B.Tarlatzis. ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 11: Posthumous assisted reproduction. Human Reproduction Vol.21, No.12 pp. 3050–3053, 2006

(16) Kirsten Riggan, MA. ‘Regulation (or Lack Thereof) of Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the U.S. and Abroad’ Post Date: 03/04/2011. The Center for Bioethics & Human Dignity [https://cbhd.org/content/regulation-or-lack-thereof-assisted-reproductive-technologies-us-and-abroad]

(17) Assisted Human Reproduction Act http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/A-13.4.pdf

(18) Wendi P. Crowe and Tyson A. Wagner “Canada: After-born Children: Succession Law And Posthumous Conception” Last Updated: November 23 2015 [http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/445542/wills+intestacy+estate+planning/Afterborn+Children+Succession+Law+and+Posthumous+Conception]

(19)  Francesco Paolo Busardò, Matteo Gulino, Simona Napoletano, Simona Zaami, and Paola Frati1,The Evolution of Legislation in the Field of Medically Assisted Reproduction and Embryo Stem Cell Research in European Union Members. BioMed Research International Volume 2014 (2014), Article ID 307160, [https://www.hindawi.com/journals/bmri/2014/307160/abs/]

(20)  European Society for Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) (2006). “ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 11: Posthumous assisted reproduction”. Human Reproduction Volume 21, No.12 pp. 3050–3053.

(21) Health Law Central: Information, Education, Research & Policy  [http://www.healthlawcentral.com/assistedreproduction/post-humous-use-gametes/]

(22) Section 23 of the  Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW) [http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/arta2007367/s23.html]

(23) Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) [http://www7.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/viewdoc/au/legis/vic/num_act/arta200876o2008406/s46.html]

(24)  Daphna Cohen-Stow and Victoria Gelfand, Israel: Update on the Status of Posthumous Sperm Retrieval for the Purpose of Later Insemination or IVF Under Israeli Law, Jul 26, 2017 [http://www.reproductivefacts.org/news-and-publications/news-and-research/legally-speaking/israel-update-on-the-status-of-posthumous-sperm-retrieval-for-the-purpose-of-later-insemination-or-ivf-under-israeli-law/]

(25) Ibid 6 

(26) Ibid 10 

(27) In re estate of Kolacy  753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).

(28) Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002) In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart

(29) Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).

(30) Capato ex rel. BNC v. Com’r of Social Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 2011)

(31) Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021, 2025-26 (2012) .

(32) Ibid 7

(33) Re the estate of the late Mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478

(34) R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority; Ex parte Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687 (CA) 

(35)  ‘Life Comes from Death’, The Sun-Herald (Sydney), 13 December 1998, 51.

(36)  Ibid 1

(37)  Ruth L Fischbach, John D Loike Postmortem fatherhood: life after life. Lancet Vol 371 June 28, 2008, p2166-67  www.thelancet.com

(38)  Daphna Cohen-Stow and Victoria Gelfand, Israel: Update on the Status of Posthumous Sperm Retrieval for the Purpose of Later Insemination or IVF Under Israeli Law, Jul 26, 2017 [http://www.reproductivefacts.org/news-and-publications/news-and-research/legally-speaking/israel-update-on-the-status-of-posthumous-sperm-retrieval-for-the-purpose-of-later-insemination-or-ivf-under-israeli-law/]

(39) Ibid 38 

(40) Richard V. Grazi and Joel B. Wolowelsky Parenthood from the Grave.  The Jewish Spectator, 65:4, Spring 2001, Aviv 5761 [http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/english/ethic/grave_1.htm]

(41)  Meyer v. Nebraska 262 US 390 (1923),

(42)   Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535 (1942),

(43)   Stanley  v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972),

(44)  Cleveland Bd. of Educ. V. LaFleur, 414U.S. 632, 639-40 (1973), 

(45)  Eisenstadt v. Baird  405 U.S. 438 (1972)

(46) Danya, The Biological Will - a New Paradigm in ART?, Published: February 25, 2013 

[http://www.newfamily.org.il/en/4905/the-biological-will%E2%84%A2-%E2%80%93-a-new-paradigm-in-art/]

(47) Richard Taylor, Human Property: Threat or Saviour? Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law Volume 9, Number 4 (December 2002) http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v9n4/taylor94_text.html#t1

(48)  Ibid 9

(49) Ibid 10

(50) Ibid 11 

(51)  C.C. v. A.W., 2005 ABQB 290 (CanLII). paras. 21

(52) Ibid 6 

(53) [2009] EWCA Civ 37; [2010] QB 1,

(54)  In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC 390, para 18

(55) [2011] NSWSC 478, para 91

(56)  Ibid 1, para 14

(57) G Pennings, G.de Wert, F.Shenfield, J.Cohen, P.Devroey and B.Tarlatzis ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 11: Posthumous assisted reproduction, Human Reproduction Vol.21, No.12 pp. 3050–3053, 2006  1_ESHRE_Task_Force_on_Ethics_and_Law_11_Posthumous_assisted_reproduction

(58) Ibid 6 

(59) Re the estate of the late Mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478

(60)  Ibid 1  .

(61) Ibid 39 Danya, The Biological Will - a New Paradigm in ART?, Published: February 25, 2013  [http://www.newfamily.org.il/en/4905/the-biological-will%E2%84%A2-%E2%80%93-a-new-paradigm-in-art/]

(62) Wendi P. Crowe and Tyson A. Wagner  Canada : After-born Children: Succession Law And Posthumous Conception Last Updated: November 23 2015 Miller Thomson LLP

[http://www.millerthomson.com/en/publications/communiques-and-updates/wealth-matters/november-2015-wealth-matters/after-born-children-succession-law-and/]

(63) In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC 390, para 18

(64) Ruth Zafran, Dying To Be A Father: Legal Paternity In Cases Of Posthumous Conception, Hous. J. Health L.& Pol’y, 2008, p 47-102

(65) Belinda Bennett. “Posthumous Reproduction and the Meanings of Autonomy”. [1999] MelbULawRw 13; (1999) 23(2) Melbourne University Law Review 286

(66) Cindy L. Steeb “A Child Conceived after His Father's Death: Posthumous Reproduction and Inheritance Rights - An Analysis of Ohio Statutes”, 48 Clev. St. L. Rev. 137 (2000) p. 138-139

(67)  Ibid 51

(68) Ibid 50

(69) Sutton, Stacey (2012) "The Real Sexual Revolution: Posthumously Conceived Children," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 73: Iss. 3, Article 12. [http://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol73/iss3/12]

(70) Anne R. Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 901 (1997).  [http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol75/iss3/4]

 (71)  Ibid 54

 

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